⚡ 本页包含 AI 生成的分析内容,仅供参考
该论文提出了一种带有本地开关电容电流均衡器的安全AES引擎,通过平衡电路中的电流消耗来抵御差分功耗分析(DPA)攻击,从而保护加密设备的密钥不被侧信道攻击泄露。
Hardware implementations of the popular AES encryption algorithm [1,2] provide attackers with important side-channel information (delay, power consumption or EM radiation) that can be used to disclose the secret key of the encryption device. Differential power analysis (DPA) [3-5] is one of the most common side-channel attacks because of its simplicity and effectiveness (Fig. 3.5.1). It performs a statistical analysis of supply-current measurements and either the plaintext or ciphertext to disclose the secret key. These two elements can be easily recorded externally without probing internal signals on the chip. Either the plaintext or ciphertext is used to build a model of the current consumption (e.g., during 0 to 1 transition) using knowledge of the AES algorithm and a key guess. By calculating the correlation between the model and the measured current for each possible key guess the key is discovered. In the
Carlos Tokunaga, David Blaauw
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI