An EM/Power SCA-Resilient AES-256 with Synthesizable Signature Attenuation Using Digital-Friendly Current Source and RO-Bleed-Based Integrated Local Feedback and Global Switched-Mode Control

📋 论文概要

该论文提出了一种针对电磁/功耗侧信道分析攻击的AES-256加密芯片，采用数字友好的电流源和环形振荡器实现签名衰减，以增强抗攻击能力。解决了传统电路级防护措施在单一策略下难以达到高安全级别的问题。

💡 主要创新点

• 提出了一种基于数字友好电流源的签名衰减技术，有效降低功耗和电磁侧信道信息泄露。
• 利用环形振荡器实现随机化，增强抗侧信道攻击能力，达到超过10亿次最小泄露轨迹数。

🏷 关键词

📄 原文摘要

side-channel information in the form of correlated power and electromagnetic (EM) signals, leading to physical sidechannel analysis (SCA) attacks. Circuit-level countermeasures against power/EM SCA include current equalizer [1], series LDO [2], IVR [3], enhancing protection up to 10M traces. Recently, current domain signature attenuation [4] and randomized NL-LDO cascaded with arithmetic countermeasures [5] achieved >1B minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) with a single and two countermeasures, respectively. Among these, the highest protection with a single strategy is achieved using signature attenuation [4],

👥 作者与机构

Archisman Ghosh1, Debayan Das1, Josef Danial1, Vivek De2, Santosh Ghosh2, Shreyas Sen1

Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN Intel, Hillsboro, OR 1 2 Mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms leak