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该论文提出了一种在Intel 4 CMOS工艺上实现的8.3-18Gbps可重构AES引擎,通过双核架构和盲体偏置技术抵抗侧信道攻击,解决了传统防护方法无法抵御强大攻击者的问题。
Amit Agarwal, Vivek K. De, Sanu K. Mathew Intel, Hillsboro, OR Power and electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attacks (SCA) exploit data-dependent power consumption from cryptographic engines to extract embedded secret keys. While series-connected voltage regulators [1,2] and arithmetic countermeasures like heterogenous Galois-field arithmetic [3] provide acceptable levels of side-channel leakage suppression, they cannot defend against determined adversaries. Random additive masking [4] on the other hand, provides a provably-secure solution [5] that disrupts first-order correlations between measured power/EM signatures and secret keys, while incurring 2× overhead in area and power consumption. In this paper, we demonstrate a reconfigurable AES accelerator fabricated in Intel 4 CMOS process with minimum-timeto-disclosure (MTD) > 1B power/EM traces in on-demand SCA-resistant mode, while providing a 2.2× boost in encryption performance during a dual-core mode of operation
Raghavan Kumar, Vikram B. Suresh, Mark A. Anders, Steven K. Hsu,