PACTOR: A Variation-Tolerant Probing-Attack Detector for a 2.5Gb/s×4-Channel Chip-to-Chip Interface in 28nm CMOS

📋 论文概要

该论文提出了一种名为PACTOR的变化容忍探针攻击检测器，用于2.5Gb/s×4通道的片间接口，在28nm CMOS工艺中实现。它解决了PCB信号迹线被探针攻击导致数据传输窃听的安全威胁，无需依赖传统加密方法的高功耗和延迟。

💡 主要创新点

• 设计了一种变化容忍的探针攻击检测电路，能够在不影响高速数据传输的情况下检测外部物理攻击。
• 实现了四通道并行接口的集成检测，每个通道支持2.5Gb/s数据速率，适用于多芯片互连场景。

🏷 关键词

📄 原文摘要

Intel, Hillsboro, OR 1 2 A probing attack on PCB signal traces poses a substantial threat, as it provides an avenue for eavesdropping on transmitted data between chips. This technique can even be exploited for a complete takeover of the victim system [1], wherein control over the entire DRAM of a server is achieved through a probing attack on the PCB traces linking the host and memory. While AES and DES can be employed to encrypt the data [2,3], they incur added power consumption and latency [4], and always enabling data encryption could be inefficient considering the relatively low frequency of probing attacks during a system’s lifespan. It is imperative to selectively activate protective measures such as AES only when an attack is in progress. Consequently, detecting probing events on PCB traces is a pivotal concern. Despite its significance, the exploration of probing-attack detection remains relatively limited. A run-time probing-attack detector based on a timeto-digital converter (T

👥 作者与机构

Mao Li1, Zhaoqing Wang1, Sanu K. Mathew2, Vivek De2, Mingoo Seok1

Columbia University, New York, NY