Sensor-Less Laser Voltage-Probing Attack Detection via Run-Time-Leakage-Shift Monitoring with 4.35% Area Overhead

📋 论文概要

本文提出了一种无传感器的激光电压探测（LVP）攻击检测方法，通过运行时泄漏偏移监测来识别攻击，避免了传统传感器带来的额外开销。该方法在芯片上实现了仅4.35%的面积开销，为低成本、低功耗的硅系统提供了有效的硬件安全防护。

💡 主要创新点

• 首次提出无传感器架构的LVP攻击检测，利用芯片运行时泄漏电流的偏移特性作为攻击指示器。
• 实现了极低的面积开销（4.35%），适合资源受限的嵌入式系统。
• 通过实时监测泄漏偏移，无需额外传感器即可检测高空间分辨率的激光探测攻击。

🏷 关键词

📄 原文摘要

Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China 1 2 *Equally Credited Authors (ECAs) Higher levels of security are constantly demanded in view of the ever-expanding threats of physical attacks [1–7], whose detection/counteraction is even more challenging in low-cost and power-constrained silicon systems. Focusing on laser attacks, laser voltage probing (LVP) has near-100% success rate thanks to high spatial resolution, short hour-range execution and hence relatively low cost, and the equipment availability from reliability and failure analysis laboratories [8–10]. LVP attacks probe on-chip voltages by shining a laser beam on targeted nets from the die backside, and averaging the backscattered beam [9–11]. Successful attacks must be completed within a few hours to avoid the non-time averaged effects of thermal and mechanical drifts in equipment, optics and silicon die [12]. Compared to laser fault injection (LFI) attacks [13–15], LVP attacks are harder to detect as

👥 作者与机构

Hui Zhang*1, Longyang Lin*2, Dingyi Xiong1, Massimo Bruno Alioto1

National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore