TinyPAD: A 166µm2/lane Variation-Tolerant Probing-Attack Detector for an 8Gb/s/lane Chip-to-Chip Interface in 16nm FinFET

📋 论文概要

提出了一种名为TinyPAD的探测攻击检测器，在16nm FinFET工艺下实现166µm2/lane的超小面积，能够检测芯片间接口上的电容变化以抵御物理探测攻击。该检测器支持高达82pF的负载和0.2pF的最小可检测电容，在-40~125°C和0.65-1.2V供电范围内鲁棒工作，并与5通道8Gb/s/lane的芯片间接口集成，相比现有技术实现了3.3倍更大负载、2.5倍更小检测电容、1.3倍更宽温度和1.2倍更宽电压范围，同时面积开销降低11倍。

💡 主要创新点

• 采用面积仅166µm2/lane的紧凑结构，实现探测攻击检测，适用于高密度芯片间互连。
• 通过变容检测技术，在宽温度（-40~125°C）和宽电压（0.65-1.2V）范围内保持鲁棒性，最小可检测电容达0.2pF。
• 与8Gb/s/lane的高速接口集成，相比先前工作大幅提升负载能力（82pF）并保持低面积开销。

🏷 关键词

📄 原文摘要

Abstract We present TinyPAD, a 166µm2/lane probing-attack detector in 16nm FinFET with 82pF maximum supported loading as well as 0.2pF minimum detectable capacitance (MDC) that operates robustly over -40 to125°C and from a 0.65-to-1.2V supply. We integrate TinyPAD in a 5-lane 8Gb/s/lane chip-to-chip interface. Compared to the prior arts, TinyPAD achieves 3.3× maximum supported loading, 2.5× smaller MDC over all voltage and temperature conditions, 1.3× wider range for temperature, 1.2× for voltage, at 11× smaller area overhead. High-speed interconnect has been unprecedentedly important with the explosive growth of computing systems, as vast volumes of data need to be transmitted fast and efficiently between chips. However, their associated security vulnerabilities [1-4] have received comparatively little attention. Physical probing of signal traces between chips on the PCB represents a significant security vulnerability, enabling attackers to eavesdrop on data

👥 作者与机构

Mao Li1, Rentao Wan1, Sanu K Mathew2, Vivek De2, Mingoo Seok1

Columbia University, New York, NY, 2Intel, Hillsboro, OR